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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CARPENTER PAPER COM-
p .1-\._NY, a Corporation, 
Plaintiff ~ Respondent~ 
vs. 
'VILLIAl\f R. BRANNOCI{, dba 





BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 




Con1mencing May 15, 1959, and terminating No-
vember 23, 1960, the Plaintiff sold and delivered goods 
and merchandise consisting of paper and supplies to 
Defendant. As of November 23, 1960, and as of the 
date of the bringing of this action, the unpaid balance 
on the account, exclusive of interest, was $1,022.56. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Case was tried to Judge Marcellus K. Snow, sitting 
without a jury. A judgment was rendered in favor of 
the Plaintiff in the amount of $1,022.56 with interest 
thereon to the date of judgment at the rate of 67o per 
annum from the 1st day of January, 1961, together 
with Plaintiff's costs, from which judgment the De-
fendant has appealed. 
RELIEF SOUGI-IT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and 
judgment in his favor as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about the 15th day of May, 1959, the De-
fendant met with Mr. E. E. Brown, the general mana-
ger of Carpenter Paper Company, in Salt Lake City 
and opened up an account in his own name with the 
Plaintiff Carpenter Paper Company. Thereafter, and 
pursuant to the express copt.ract between the parties, 
the Plaintiff delivered goods and. 1nerchandise to the 
Defendant, doing business as Bill's Dairy Queen, lo-
cated at 1521 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Thereafter, a course of dealings existed between the 
parties by which orders would be received from the 
manager of Bill's Dairy Queen, one Clifford Webb or 
other e1n ployees; the merchandise would be delivered, 
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and payments were received on the account periodically. 
The amount which remains unpaid on the account for 
merchandise sold and delivered is not in dispute; both 
parties agreeing that the correct amount is $1,022.56. 
Defendant contends that subsequent to October 30, 
1959, Mr. Clifford Webb managed the business for 
himself, and not for Mr. Brannock. Mr. Brannock, 
in his testimony, alleges no notice of the alleged transfer 
from Brannock to Webb of the business whatsoever 
and Mr. Webb in his testimony denies that any notice 
was ever given. Both Mr. E. E. Brown and Mr. Gerald 
R. Hyde of the Carpenter Paper Company deny that 
they received any notice of any alleged transfer of the 
business from William R. Brannock to Clifford Webb. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
"That there was no transfer from Defendant 
Brannock to Webb (of) Defendant's business, Bill's 
Dairy Queen." 
This finding was made by the Court pursuant to 
the issues as specified in the pre-trial order contained 
on page 16 of the transcript. The first issue there framed 
by the Court is (I) Was there transfer from Defendant 
to 'V ebb of Defendant's business, Bill's Dairy Queen? 
To this the Court has answered in the negative. On this 
point the evidence is somewhat in conflict, however, the 
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Court is justified in its finding that there was no lease 
for the fallowing reasons : 
1. Mr. Webb in his statement, page 87, line 29 of 
the transcript, in answer to the question, "Now did you 
ever lease this business from 1\tir. Brannock?" answered 
on page 88, line 1~ "Answer. "I never leased it. No." 
Now thereafter and continuing in his testimony 'f'rom 
line 2 through line 22, page 88, the witness, Mr. Webb, 
alleges therein that at some time during 1960 the De-
fendant Brannock attempted to enter into a lease 
arrangement through a written instrument, but that 
Mr. Webb refused to sign the same. At no time duririg 
the testimony introduced by Defendant was any such 
instrument introduced. Furthermore, the findings 
were justified by the evidence through the statement of 
Mr. Brannock himself, who reported to the Court com-
mencing on page 109, line 29 through line 15 of page 
110, wherein it is specified that the telephone listing, 
the account with the power con1pany, the sales tax 
license, and perhaps the city license all continued in 
the name of William R. Brannock. The findings o( th~ 
Court were proper in that any proposed lease by Mr. 
Brannock as testified to by the Messrs. Stanger (an 
employee) and Borg (a supplier) was nothing· more 
than a sham and not a bona fide lease at all. 
2. With respect to the proposition wherein it Is 
alleged that the Defendant 'V ebb acknowledged the 
debt by having listed the same in the Bankruptcy 
Schedule, constittlting page 9 of the transcript ( cer-
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tified copy) indicates merely that a case has been filed 
in the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County in the State of Utah, No. 130646, in which the 
Defendant Clifford Webb is listed as a Third Party 
Defendant. This filing constitutes the entire acknowl-
edgement by Webb in his bankruptcy filing of the 
responsibility for the obligation. 
POINT II. 
"That there was no notice, actual or constructive, 
of a contemplated transfer of Defendant's business 
from Defendant Brannock to Webb." 
1. The second question proposed by the Court 
of the pre-trial order was as follows: ( 2) Did Plaintiff 
have notice, actual or constructive, of the transfer of 
Defendant's business to Webb? In this respect, the 
finding of the Court is not entirely consistent with the 
question as posed by the pre-trial Court in that the 
word "contemplated" has been added therein. For this 
purpose we shall limit our arguments only to the 
questions of whether or not there was notice, actual 
or constructive, of a transfer of the business from 
Brannock to Webb if there was in fact any such trans-
fer. As a matter of law, once the Court has found 
that ther was no transfer, notice would not be rna terial. 
In the interest of time, however, and in order to present 
an accurate brief on the evidence which is now before 
the Court, and on the assumption that there was in 
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fact a transfer of the business and a transfer of. the 
responsibilities incidental thereto, we shall herein touch 
upon the question of notice. The Plaintiff does not 
deny, speaking through Mr. Brown, that they are aware 
of the type of business which Mr. Brannock operates 
in this community; and the evidence . is not in dispute 
as to the number of years over which the parties have 
done business or of the amount of business done. State-
ments alleged by counsel for Appellant with respect 
to the opening of the business in the early part of 1959, 
are not in controversy, that being the time at which the 
account was established and one of the primary elements 
of Plaintiff's case. Counsel for Appellant in his brief 
on page 8 alludes to the fact that Mr. Hyde, the opera-
tional manager of the Plaintiff, denied that he knew 
of a subsequent transfer of this business in N ov~mber, 
1960. Respondent has examined the brief and has been 
unable to find any such denial, nor is he able to find 
that counsel has ref erred to on page 50 under line 
51 which subsequenHy acknowledges ~nowledge of a 
transf.er. It is admitted that thereafter (November, 
1960) a clerical error was effected on the books of the 
Plaintiff which was im1nediately corrected as soon as no-
tice of the error was brought to the proper part~es. This 
touches only upon the amounts which was erroneously 
listed on this account and subsequently transferred to 
the Hi-Jinks Cmnpany account (the subseq~ent opera-
tors of the business.) No claim was made for the amounts· 
incurred by the Hi-Jinks Company by the Plaintiff. 
at any time. 
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2. Plaintiff makes no claim whatsoever for 
amounts incurred by the other operators of the Dairy 
Queen stores in Salt. Lake City. According to the tes-
timony of Mr. Brown, as well as that of Mr. Brannock, 
this is the only store which Mr .. Brannock operated 
personally. 
3. The other ingredients which Defendant seeks 
to sp~cify touching upon the question ~ notice con-
cern itself with the checks, the color of which was sub-
, ' ' 
sequently changed (Exhibits D-8, 10, II, 13, 14 and 
15) ; upon the fact that Mr. Webb, the manager of 
the establishment throughout the entire ~enure of 
business, signed the checks subsequent ~o November 
1, 1959, and upon the fact that the account was nqt 
paid as expeditiously subsequent to November 1, 1959, 
as prior thereto. The Court is reminded of the factthat 
Mrs. Brannock was able to sign checks on this account 
both prior to and subsequent to the alleged transfer 
of the business and that the Court is justified in its 
findings that neither the change in color of checks, nor 
the signature thereon, imparts any reasonable notice, 
if notice at all. 
Counsel for the Respondent urges the Court that 
with respect to Defendant's Exhibit 16, an inter office 
memo dictated by Mr. E. E. Brown to a Mr. Mueller 
of the executive office that said letter contains some 
sort of. declaration to the effect that notice was de-
livered by Brannock the preceding year, that the Court 
should bear in mind that this letter was dictated in 
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1961, some months after termination of the account, 
and then only does the notice refer to something which 
Mr. Brannock was saying he had previously said. The 
only notice, page 61, line 1 through 13, touches upon 
a memo which Mr. Hyde had dictated into the account 
(Exhibit D-9) on the day that the attempt was made 
to collect the account during the year 1960. At that 
time the record indicates Brannock had made a request 
that Carpenter Paper "hold up" until he (Brannock) 
could start a legal action against some third party. To 
counsel this indicates nothing n1ore than an attempt 
on the part of Defendant Brannock to confuse the issue 
with matters which are not in evidence. Brannock him-
self was on the stand, had opportunity to testify as to 
whether or not he had given notice to Carpenter Paper 
or any of its representatives, and chose not to do so for 
the obvious reason that no notice was in fact given. 
4. Exhibit D-9, touching upon the question of 
notice, states merely as follows: "On April 28, 1960, 
I called you regarding a past due balance on the 
account at that time and I asked for clarification as 
to who was running it. You stated that because of your 
situation at that time you would be responsible for 
all bills incurred, but that your manager Cliff was 
running the place." The use of the words "your man-
ager" would not be inconsistent with the fact that he 
was "actually running the place" inasmuch as it is 
presumed normal that a manager would be in fact 
running an establishment. The important phase of these 
words appears to be in the question of who was in fact 
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the proprietor and this seems to flow generally from the 
erroneous connotation that the proprietor and manager 
must be the.same person. In that letter, dated November 
7, 1960, nothing is said whatsoever which would impart 
notice from the Defendant to the Plaintiff that there 
had actually been a lease and a transfer of responsibility 
for charges incurred by said business. 
POINT III. 
"Defendant William R. Brannock is indebted to 
Plaintiff for goods sold and delivered in the amount 
of $1,022.56." 
Counsel for Appellant now seeks to attack the 
ledger which was submitted in evidence even though 
the same was introduced without objection (P 29 
L 21-22). The account was orignially opened up by 
Mr. Brannock himself (P 26 L 22-30). At no time 
thereafter, did the Plaintiff !ook to anyone else for 
payment other than J\'Ir. Brannock himself. No filing 
was made at any time of a certificate to operate under an 
assun1ed name with Salt Lake County or with the State 
of Utah (P 110 L 13-14). Actually the first page of 
the ledger was not missing as specified by counsel 
(P 43 L 7-11). At that time Mr. Hyde was merely 
going over the ledger sheets which were in his hands 
and assumed he did not have the first one even though 
subsequently (line 12-14) the same was produced as 
page 1 thereof, was received in evidence and is 
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now contained in the record. Thereafter, with refer-
ence to Exhibits P-4, P-5 and P-6, the same were 
introduced merely for the purpose of building a foun-
dation to the ledger itself. Mr. Hyde testified (P 40 
L 17 through P 41 L 23) what must be done prior 
to the time that an item is billed on the ledger card. 
Mr. Hyde was able to testify as to routine which is fol-
lowed showing that an item is actually deliver~d and 
priced correctly prior to being placed on the ledger. 
2. The basis of the action based upon merchandise 
or goods sold and delivered had its origin in the old 
common law action of Assumpsit. Reading from 4 
Am. Jur. P 496, we quote the following: 
"Assumpsit has to a considerable extent sup-
planted the old common law action of account, as 
being more simple and less expensive. But there 
is a real distinction between assumpsit and ac-
count rendered, for one action is based on a duty 
to pay, whereas the other is based on a duty to 
account. When the promise, express or implied, 
involves the duty of direct payment to the plain-
tiff, assumpsit is the proper form of action; 
where the duty is not direct, but one of outlay 
in the performance of a trust or business which 
from its nature requires an exhibit of the sums 
expended before the direct duty can arise, the 
legal requirement is to render an account, and 
assumpsit will not lie until the balance is ascer-
tained.'' 
In this case we have not alleged that any of these goods 
were actually and specifically ordered by Mr. Bran-
nock. Generally speaking, the Plaintiff assumes that 
10 
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the orders were turned in by Mr. Webb, the manager 
of the establishment for Mr. Brannock throughout 
this entire period of time, but they might have been 
subn1itted by other persons. With respect to delivery, 
the Plaintiff does not maintain that these items were ac-
tually delivered to Mr. Brannock personally. There 
is actual privity between the parties in that the account 
was established by lVIr. Brannock himself. Thereafter 
the account was paid by checks drawn on the account 
of Bill's Dairy Queen, a proprietorship owned and 
operated by Mr. Brannock. Nothing was done in the 
course of dealing between the parties to change the 
arrangement which was established originally. Items 
delivered prior to November 1, 1959, although not 
delivered to Mr. Brannock personally, were paid for 
by Mr. Brannock. Items delivered subsequent thereto 
were delivered in the same course and according to 
the same arrangement as prior thereto and checks 
were received in payment therefor on checks drawn 
under the name and account of "Bill's Dairy Queen". 
The business records which were introduced by the 
Plaintiff were for the purpose of indicating that the 
goods were actually sold and delivered to the establish-
ment; that the price therefor was in accordance with 
the general terms and agreements of the parties, and 
that there remains unpaid on the goods sold and de-
livered the amount of $1,022.56. 
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POINT IV. 
"The Court erred in admitting Exhibit P-1, and 
Exhibits P-4, P-5, and P-6 and (incompetent to justify 
the conclusion or judgment)." 
The point brought up by the Appellant herein 
appears to be in two parts, namely: 
1. The error in admission of the documents and 
2. The allegation that the same are incompetent 
to justify judgment. 
With respect to the former we urge the Court 
herein that the same were admitted without objection 
in each instance, and that the same cannot be objected 
to upon appeal. Nevertheless, we feel these ex-
hibits are competent and material. Arguments on 
this point have heretofore been presented. With re-
spect to the competency of the same to justify the 
judgment we have the following: 
1. The establishment of the account by Brannock. 
2. The course of dealing between the parties from 
May 15, 1959, through October 30, 1959. 
3. The continued course of orders and deliveries 
subsequent thereto to the termination of the account 
in October of 1960. 
4. The introduction of the ledger showing the 
balance to be $1,022.56 on the said account. 
5. The introduction of P-4 which indicates the type 
of orders used by the company. 
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6. The introduction of Exhibits P-5 and P-6, 
which trace one particula1:' order from the time it is 
ordered until it appears on the ledger and a statement 
by :\Ir. Hyde (P 41 L 15) in which he states that each 
and every entry on the ledger ( P 41 L 6 through 9) 
is supported by background information identical with 
that on the' item introduced. 
Both Mr. Brown and Mr. Hyde testified as to 
the accuracy of Exhibit P-1. Mr. Brown is the general 
manager and Mr. Hyde is the credit manager under 
whose direction the ledger was kept in the regular 
course of business. 
CONCLUSION 
. A good deal of what counsel for Appellant dis-
cusses in his brief touches upon the accuracy of the 
account. This· matter is actually discussed at the time 
of pre-trial and no question whatsoever is raised as 
to the accuracy of the balance due. The issues resolved 
at the pre-trial were only three: 
1. "Was there a transfer of the business?" 
2. "Did the Plaintiff have notice, actual or con-
structive, of the transfer of the business?" and 
3. "Even though there was a transfer to Webb and 
notice thereof to the Plaintiff, did the Defendant prom-
ise to pay for subsequent deliveries to Webb in reliance 
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We have touched upon the first two points and very 
little is in evidence with respect to the third. An issue 
of law was raised at the pre-trial and disposed of as 
follows: 
1. The Court rules in favor of the Plaintiff that if 
it should be agreed that the facts would show without 
dispute that after a course of dealing with Plaintiff, 
Defendant dropped out of the business and substituted 
Webb in his place but gave no notice of the change, 
either actual or constructive to Plaintiff; that the 
Plaintiff relying on Defendant's credit, continued to 
make the sales and deliveries to Bill's Dairy Queen. 
From the evidence as discussed herein, the Court 
has ruled that there was actually no transfer or lease 
of the business from the Defendant to Mr. Webb. 
Following thereafter the Court concludes that there 
was no notice actual or constructive of the transfer 
of the business. In view of these facts and in accordance 
with the trial court, it is respectfully urged your Honor-
Court that the judgment of the trial court be affirmed. 
The Appellant does not urge the Court to make a 
change in the findings as a matter of fact, but only urges 
that change be made as a matter of law. \Ve see no 
justification for his contentions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. M. HAYNIE 
Attorney for Respondent 
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